● Rate Shock, AI Surge, Liquidity Twist
Interest Rates Are Rising While Money Is Being Injected: The Real Reason Behind Bond Yield Stress, U.S. Equity Strength, and the AI Liquidity Rally
The market’s main point of confusion is straightforward.
Central banks are raising rates or maintaining a hawkish stance, while governments are simultaneously injecting more liquidity.
As a result, government bond yields have climbed to levels rarely seen in more than 20 years, yet U.S. equities and the Nasdaq are strengthening again, led by AI-related names.
This report summarizes why bond yields remain elevated, why the liquidity rally has not ended, why capital is flowing into the U.S. AI value chain rather than Korean equities, and which variables matter most for rate outlooks and market positioning.
1. The key market development: higher rates and liquidity support are happening at the same time
The defining feature of global markets is the divergence between monetary and fiscal policy.
Monetary policy is turning more restrictive due to renewed inflation concerns.
By contrast, fiscal policy remains expansionary through defense spending, slowdown mitigation, elections, energy subsidies, infrastructure investment, and AI support measures.
- Central banks are keeping policy tight to contain inflation.
- Governments are expanding spending to support growth and strategic industries.
- Higher fiscal spending requires greater sovereign bond issuance.
- Higher bond supply lowers bond prices and raises yields.
- The liquidity created is not broadly distributed; it is concentrated in U.S. AI leaders and semiconductor supply chains.
This is the core structure driving current market behavior.
Rates are high, liquidity remains available, and capital is flowing selectively.
2. Why bond yields are rising: six structural drivers
Bond yield increases cannot be explained by a single factor.
Geopolitics, inflation, fiscal expansion, supply-demand dynamics, China, and private-sector balance sheet shifts are all contributing.
2-1. Geopolitical risk: Middle East tensions and higher oil prices
The first variable is Middle East geopolitical risk.
Escalation in the region and concerns about disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz can quickly lift crude oil prices.
Higher oil prices raise energy, logistics, and production costs.
Markets then price in a renewed inflation risk.
A key difference from prior cycles is the behavior of major oil exporters.
In the past, higher oil prices generated large current-account surpluses for countries such as Saudi Arabia, part of which was recycled into U.S. Treasuries.
Recently, however, concerns over U.S. security commitments in the Middle East have reduced the likelihood of the same scale of Treasury demand.
Oil is rising while support for U.S. bonds is weakening.
2-2. Inflation reacceleration: price stability has not fully returned
Higher oil prices also lift inflation expectations.
When markets expect inflation to reaccelerate, central banks are forced to keep rates higher for longer or consider further tightening.
Bond yields tend to react first.
Stronger-than-expected CPI, PCE, or PPI data can add to upward pressure on yields.
If inflation data remains contained, yields may peak and ease.
For that reason, rate outlooks should not be based solely on central bank communication.
Oil, Middle East developments, and inflation data must be assessed together.
2-3. Fiscal expansion: government spending requires more bond issuance
Fiscal expansion is one of the most important factors in the current environment.
The key difference from earlier periods is that monetary policy is tight while fiscal policy remains loose.
During the pandemic, both policy arms were expansionary.
From 2022 onward, both monetary and fiscal conditions became more restrictive.
Today, rates are high, but fiscal support remains active.
To finance stimulus, defense, reconstruction, energy support, industrial policy, and AI infrastructure, governments must issue more debt.
When issuance increases, the market demands higher yields.
In effect, fiscal expansion supports liquidity in the short term but also pushes bond yields higher.
2-4. Reduced demand from China: a major historical buyer is no longer accumulating at the same pace
China was once one of the largest holders of U.S. Treasuries.
Since the mid-2010s, however, its Treasury holdings have been in decline.
More recently, U.S.-China tensions and reserve management shifts have drawn greater attention to Chinese selling or reduced accumulation.
When China buys less or sells Treasuries, other investors must absorb the supply.
That typically requires higher yields.
2-5. Ownership shift in Treasuries: from the Fed to the private sector
Another important change is the shift in Treasury ownership.
In the past, the Federal Reserve absorbed large amounts of Treasury supply through quantitative easing.
Since 2022, the Fed has moved to quantitative tightening and is no longer a large incremental buyer.
The gap is now being filled by private investors.
Private investors are more yield-sensitive than the Fed.
As ownership shifts from public-sector buyers to private-sector buyers, yields are likely to remain structurally higher.
2-6. Higher corporate bond issuance by big tech and hyperscalers
AI investment is increasing capital needs for hyperscalers.
Data centers, GPUs, memory semiconductors, power grids, cooling systems, and AI server infrastructure require substantial funding.
When internal cash flow is insufficient, companies issue bonds.
The issue is that both governments and major technology companies are increasing debt supply at the same time.
Greater supply across the bond market raises the required yield for investors.
As a result, Treasury yields and corporate yields can remain elevated together.
3. Will bond yields rise further? A higher-for-longer environment remains likely
Near-term yield direction will depend on inflation, oil prices, geopolitics, and central bank communication.
However, structurally, a return to the previous low-rate regime is unlikely.
The reasons are clear.
- Government debt continues to rise.
- Fiscal expansion is difficult to reverse.
- China and Middle Eastern buyers are less likely to absorb Treasuries at prior levels.
- The Federal Reserve is no longer acting as an unlimited buyer.
- Private investors require higher compensation.
- AI-related capex is increasing corporate bond supply.
Yields may retreat from peaks, but the more likely outcome is a higher-for-longer regime rather than a return to the ultra-low-rate environment of the past.
4. Is this a tightening cycle? The more accurate answer is a mixed regime
Understanding the current cycle requires clear periodization.
The interaction between rates and fiscal policy has changed materially over time.
4-1. 2020-2021: an easing cycle
To respond to the pandemic, central banks cut rates aggressively.
Both the U.S. and Korea moved toward near-zero policy rates, while fiscal spending expanded sharply.
This created a classic liquidity-driven market.
4-2. 2022 to mid-2024: a tightening cycle
The Russia-Ukraine war, energy shocks, and supply-chain disruptions pushed inflation higher.
The Federal Reserve raised rates rapidly, and other major central banks followed.
Inflation control became the priority, even at the cost of slower growth.
4-3. 2025 to early 2026: a pivot phase
As inflation moderated, central banks began moving toward neutral policy levels.
The U.S. started to normalize from restrictive rates, and Korea followed a similar direction.
This period was interpreted as a pivot rather than a renewed stimulus cycle.
4-4. After 2026: a mixed regime of tightening and expansion
Middle East risk and renewed inflation concerns have pushed monetary policy back toward a tighter stance.
At the same time, governments continue to use fiscal expansion to support growth and strategic investment.
The result is neither a classic tightening cycle nor a classic easing cycle.
It is a mixed regime: tighter money, looser fiscal policy.
In this environment, yields rise while liquidity remains present.
That is why the question is not why the market is strong despite higher rates, but where the liquidity is going.
5. Why U.S. equities and the Nasdaq remain strong: capital is returning to AI
Higher bond yields typically weigh on equities.
When Treasuries offer 5-6% returns, the relative appeal of risk assets declines.
Higher rates generally exert downward pressure on equities, real estate, gold, and cryptocurrencies.
Yet the Nasdaq remains resilient for one reason.
The market is concentrating on AI companies that can justify valuation through earnings growth.
- AI companies have strong revenue growth potential.
- Large-cap technology firms can access bond markets credibly.
- Hyperscalers can sustain large capex programs.
- AI services rely on data centers and semiconductor investment.
- This supports Nvidia, memory semiconductors, power infrastructure, and semiconductor equipment.
Liquidity is not spreading evenly across markets; it is being redirected into the AI value chain.
Capital is moving toward companies with visible earnings power and strategic relevance.
6. Why Korean equities remain range-bound: semiconductors are strong, but market confidence is weaker
Korean equities are benefiting from AI-related semiconductor demand.
Samsung Electronics and SK Hynix are seeing stronger earnings expectations from memory cycle recovery and AI server demand.
HBM, DRAM, NAND, and other high-performance memory products are directly tied to AI investment.
However, the broader KOSPI has struggled to match the strength of U.S. technology indices.
Investor confidence remains weaker after prior drawdowns.
When the market rises, profit-taking pressure tends to appear quickly.
Both domestic and foreign investors often use strength to reduce exposure.
By contrast, U.S. AI leaders remain at the center of global capital flows.
AI infrastructure, cloud services, data centers, semiconductors, power grids, and software monetization remain heavily U.S.-centric.
Korea is participating in the AI cycle, but the primary destination for global liquidity remains the U.S. market.
7. Leadership changes over time: after Nvidia, the focus may shift to memory, power, and physical AI
Market leadership is never static.
From 2020 to 2021, ESG and renewable energy were in favor.
That was followed by metaverse and NFT speculation, then electric vehicles and batteries.
In 2025, GPU-centered AI semiconductors led the market, with Nvidia as the core beneficiary.
From 2026 onward, the investment bottleneck is unlikely to remain limited to GPUs.
More AI servers require more memory chips.
More data centers require more power infrastructure.
Higher electricity demand increases the need for transformers, power equipment, cooling systems, and energy storage.
As AI expands into real-world applications, robotics, automation, sensors, and edge computing may become more important.
Accordingly, the AI value chain is likely to broaden beyond GPUs to memory semiconductors, materials, components, equipment, power infrastructure, data centers, and physical AI.
8. The real shock of the high-rate era: corporate selection is intensifying
Higher bond yields first trigger crowding-out effects.
When governments issue more debt, capital is pulled toward sovereign bonds.
Private borrowers then face higher funding costs.
Companies with weaker access to capital may cut investment and hiring.
This leads to a more selective market.
Companies with strong earnings can still issue debt and continue investing.
Companies with weaker margins or balance sheets face greater pressure.
Higher rates expose corporate fundamentals.
A similar dynamic was visible during the real estate PF stress in 2022-2023.
Businesses that could survive in a low-rate environment reached their limits as rates rose.
Weaker developers and financial institutions were forced into restructuring or exit processes.
Equities may face a similar environment, where only the strongest companies continue to outperform.
9. The key point often missed in market commentary: the direction of capital matters more than yields alone
Many market commentaries focus on yield moves, Fed hawkishness, or Nasdaq strength.
However, the more important issue is where capital is flowing.
This is not a market with no liquidity.
Liquidity exists.
The difference is that it is no longer lifting all risk assets broadly.
It is being concentrated in a narrow set of companies that can demonstrate AI monetization and strong financial capacity.
That is the critical distinction.
In earlier liquidity rallies, most risk assets rose together.
Today, higher rates and fiscal expansion coexist, so liquidity is selective.
U.S. AI leaders, semiconductors, power infrastructure, and data centers remain the most likely beneficiaries.
For investors, the question is not only whether rates rise or fall.
The more important question is which companies can attract capital despite high rates.
Those companies are likely to define the next phase of the market.
10. Key variables to monitor
- Whether Middle East risk eases and crude oil stabilizes in the $60-70 range.
- Whether CPI, PCE, and PPI reaccelerate.
- Whether the Fed or other major central banks signal additional tightening.
- Whether U.S. Treasury issuance and auction demand remain stable.
- Whether China and Middle Eastern sovereign holders continue reducing Treasury exposure.
- Whether hyperscaler bond issuance and AI capex remain elevated.
- Whether AI demand broadens from GPUs to memory semiconductors, power infrastructure, and physical AI.
- Whether Korean investors continue to favor selective AI value chain names over the broader KOSPI.
11. Market interpretation: why AI can remain strong even in a high-rate environment
In a high-rate environment, capital becomes more expensive.
As funding costs rise, most companies lose flexibility.
However, AI has become a globally competitive area where firms cannot easily stop investing without falling behind.
That is why investment continues even when rates are high.
Large U.S. technology companies benefit from strong cash flow, high credit quality, and access to capital markets.
They can issue debt at elevated rates to fund data centers and AI infrastructure.
As a result, AI leaders are not merely surviving the high-rate regime; they are among its strongest performers.
At the same time, companies with weaker funding capacity are likely to lag further.
Equity dispersion within the technology sector is likely to widen.
The market is not rewarding all technology names equally; it is rewarding those with visible AI revenue and earnings conversion.
12. Core conclusion for investors
This is not a market that can be explained simply by saying rates are high, therefore equities are weak.
It is also not accurate to say that fiscal support automatically lifts all assets.
The current environment combines high rates, expansionary fiscal policy, and an AI investment cycle.
High bond yields weigh on broad asset prices.
However, liquidity created by fiscal policy and AI capex is concentrated in specific sectors.
The main beneficiaries are U.S. AI leaders, semiconductors, memory chips, power infrastructure, and data centers.
Accordingly, investors should focus less on the market index as a whole and more on companies that can secure funding and sustain earnings in a high-rate environment.
Even if the Nasdaq continues to outperform, internal dispersion is likely to remain wide.
< Summary >
The market is currently in a regime where rates are rising while money is still being injected.
Bond yields remain elevated due to Middle East risk, inflation concerns, fiscal expansion, reduced Treasury demand from China and some sovereign buyers, Federal Reserve balance sheet tightening, and a shift toward private-sector demand.
Fiscal expansion supports liquidity but also increases bond supply and pushes yields higher.
As a result, the market is not experiencing a broad-based liquidity rally but a selective one concentrated in U.S. AI leaders and the semiconductor value chain.
Korean equities are benefiting from semiconductor exposure, but range-bound trading remains possible due to profit-taking and weaker confidence.
Going forward, the key issue is not only the direction of bond yields, but which companies can fund growth and demonstrate earnings resilience in a high-rate environment.
[Related Articles…]
*Source: [ 경제 읽어주는 남자(김광석TV) ]
– [풀버전] 금리는 올리는데 돈은 푼다…지금 시장이 이상하게 움직이는 이유 | 클로즈업 | 국채불안
● Pension Shock, KOSPI Crash, Rebalance Delay, Retirement Risk
How Much Did the National Pension Service Really Lose in a Down Market? A Full Review of the KOSPI Drop, Rebalancing Delay, and Pension Depletion Risk
The key issue here is not simply that the National Pension Service “lost 120 trillion won.”
The more important questions are why the NPS could not sell at the KOSPI peak, how that decision affected the pension depletion timeline, and how fragile Korea’s equity market supply-demand structure has become.
In particular, the overlap of the end of pension fund buying, foreign net selling, and the end of share buybacks by Samsung Electronics and SK hynix intensified downward pressure on the KOSPI.
This article reviews the changes in the NPS domestic equity valuation, the controversy over rebalancing deferral, actual trading flows by foreign and retail investors, and implications for the economic outlook and asset allocation strategy.
1. Key News: The Origin of the NPS Loss Controversy
Recent reports have drawn attention to a decline of roughly 120 trillion won in the National Pension Service’s domestic equity valuation during July.
Strictly speaking, this was not a realized loss but a decline in the market value of domestic equity holdings from a peak level.
Equities only crystallize gains or losses when sold, so the current debate is more about opportunity cost from failing to reduce exposure at the top than about realized losses.
Based on the figures cited in the original source, the NPS domestic equity portfolio stood at approximately 263 trillion won at the end of 2025.
As the KOSPI rallied, this is estimated to have risen to around 543 trillion won by the end of June.
By simple calculation, domestic equity valuation increased by about 280 trillion won.
At the time, the strong improvement in the NPS investment return also raised expectations that the pension depletion date could be delayed.
However, as the KOSPI corrected in July, the domestic equity valuation reportedly fell to around 418 trillion won.
This represents a decline of more than 120 trillion won from the June peak.
Data for August and September were not confirmed in the original source, and the subsequent October decline may have widened the reduction further.
2. Summary of NPS Domestic Equity Valuation Changes
| Period | Estimated Domestic Equity Valuation | Key Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| End-2025 | About 263 trillion won | Baseline before the rally |
| End-June 2026 | About 543 trillion won | KOSPI peak zone, up about 280 trillion won |
| July 2026 | About 418 trillion won | More than 120 trillion won in valuation decline in one month |
| Estimated at KOSPI 5,668 | About 365 trillion won | Still positive versus prior year, but down about 180 trillion won from the peak |
The key point is that, on a year-over-year basis, the NPS has not yet incurred a loss.
If domestic equities were valued at around 365 trillion won versus 263 trillion won at the end of 2025, there would still be roughly 100 trillion won of unrealized gains.
However, compared with the June peak of 543 trillion won, around 180 trillion won of paper gains has disappeared.
If the KOSPI falls further into the low 5,000s, the opportunity cost from the peak could exceed 200 trillion won.
3. Why Did the NPS Not Sell at the Peak?
In January 2026, the NPS Fund Management Committee temporarily deferred domestic equity rebalancing.
The original target weight for domestic equities was around 14.4%, but by May the target allocation had expanded to 20.8%.
With an additional flexible range of about 8%, the effective domestic equity allocation could reach 28.8%.
This decision coincided almost exactly with the KOSPI rally.
As the pension fund continued to hold or buy domestic equities, the market rose sharply.
By the end of June, the domestic equity weight had reached around 29.1%, effectively exceeding the permitted range.
At that point, market participants began to say that the NPS could no longer keep buying domestic stocks.
During parliamentary audit hearings, the NPS chairman explained that if rebalancing had not been deferred, the fund would have needed to sell about 800 billion won of domestic equities per day, which could have caused major market disruption.
In other words, selling at the peak would have protected returns, but it could also have made the NPS a direct source of downward pressure on the KOSPI.
By contrast, not selling reduced immediate market impact but weakened the fund’s investment performance.
This is the core dilemma in the current controversy.
4. The Dilemma Created by Rebalancing Deferral
The traditional role of a pension fund is to sell when valuations are high and buy when they are low.
That mechanism helps moderate excesses during rallies and provides a stabilizing force during downturns.
In this case, however, rebalancing was deferred at the peak, and selling resumed only after the market had already entered a correction phase.
According to the source, the decision to end the June rebalancing deferral was made on May 28, and rebalancing resumed in July.
The problem is that this timing overlapped with the market downturn.
As a result, the NPS came to be seen not as a stabilizer in the decline, but as a contributor to additional selling pressure.
That said, this should not be reduced to a simple claim that the NPS made a mistake.
At the time, market sentiment was strongly optimistic, with expectations that the KOSPI would continue rising.
Brokerages, institutions, and retail investors were all discussing further upside.
Had the NPS sold heavily then, it likely would have faced criticism for helping trigger a pullback in the KOSPI.
5. The Real Supply-Demand Structure Behind the KOSPI Decline
The most important factor in this decline was supply-demand imbalance.
Foreign investors reportedly sold around 47 trillion won in the KOSPI over the past three months.
At the same time, share buybacks by Samsung Electronics and SK hynix are estimated to have exceeded 50 trillion won, absorbing a significant portion of foreign selling.
In other words, the reason the KOSPI was able to hold up through August and September was not primarily strong retail buying, but rather large-scale corporate buybacks from major semiconductor companies that absorbed foreign net selling.
Once the impact of those buybacks weakened or ended, the KOSPI came under renewed pressure.
Retail investors reportedly recorded only about 8 trillion won in net selling over the same three-month period.
This suggests that retail investors did not exit aggressively at the top and remained in the market longer than expected.
Relative to the 47 trillion won sold by foreigners, retail investors were in a much less favorable position.
6. What the Trading Flows of Foreigners, Retail Investors, and Institutions Reveal
- Foreign investors reduced risk quickly, recording roughly 47 trillion won in net selling after the peak.
- Share buybacks by Samsung Electronics and SK hynix were a key source of demand absorbing foreign selling.
- Retail investors recorded only about 8 trillion won in net selling and appear not to have exited sufficiently at the top.
- Institutions did not show net buying large enough to alter the broader trend.
- If pension fund buying weakens and buybacks decline, the market may lose a major source of support.
In the end, the KOSPI decline is not merely a sentiment-driven move but a supply shortage problem.
When foreign capital exits, the pension fund cannot fully absorb the flow, and corporate buybacks also fade, the market can weaken quickly.
This is the most important issue to monitor when assessing Korea’s equity market outlook.
7. NPS Returns and the Pension Depletion Problem
The pension depletion issue ultimately comes down to two options.
One is for younger generations to pay higher contributions.
The other is for current or future beneficiaries to receive less.
Politically, neither option is easy.
However, in a democracy, resistance from current beneficiaries is often more immediate and intense.
For that reason, the long-term burden is likely to shift toward younger generations.
The only meaningful third lever is improving the NPS investment return.
When the KOSPI rises sharply and the NPS records large valuation gains, expectations increase that the pension depletion date can be delayed.
But as the market corrected, that expectation weakened again.
Ultimately, the NPS must continue balancing stability and return.
If it holds too much domestic equity, pension finances become highly exposed to Korea’s market volatility.
If it reduces domestic equity exposure, criticism may arise that it is abandoning the local market.
8. The Most Important Point Rarely Highlighted Elsewhere
The most important issue is not how much the NPS lost in the short term, but how dependent the Korean stock market was on pension fund buying and large-cap share buybacks.
Markets appear to move on earnings, rates, the won-dollar exchange rate, US equity trends, and the AI semiconductor cycle, but short-term price action is often determined by supply-demand flow.
The KOSPI held up during the period when pension fund and buyback demand were strong.
Once the NPS’s buying capacity weakened and Samsung Electronics and SK hynix reduced buyback support, the next question became who would step in as the marginal buyer.
Whether foreign capital returns, retail investors add exposure, or corporate earnings lift valuations again will be decisive.
Another key issue is that as the NPS becomes more concentrated in domestic equities, Korea’s economy and pension finances can become more tightly linked to the same market cycle.
If Korean corporate earnings weaken, stock prices fall, NPS returns deteriorate, and pressure for pension reform increases.
In that environment, global diversification is not optional but essential.
If AI semiconductor expectations were a major driver of Samsung Electronics and SK hynix share prices, then any slowdown in AI investment or correction in US tech stocks could also hit the Korean market hard.
Excessive dependence on the Korean semiconductor cycle for NPS returns is structurally risky over the long term.
This is the least discussed but arguably most important point in the debate.
9. What Investors Should Monitor Now
- Whether foreign net selling is ending.
- Whether share buybacks by Samsung Electronics and SK hynix continue.
- The NPS domestic equity weight and its rebalancing stance.
- Whether the KOSPI can recover only if semiconductor earnings expectations improve again.
- Whether the won-dollar exchange rate and US interest rates stabilize enough to support foreign inflows.
- The need for an asset allocation strategy that includes US equities, bonds, the dollar, gold, and cash.
Retail investors should not buy simply because the NPS is buying, nor should they sell simply because the NPS is selling.
The NPS operates under a very different mandate, time horizon, and responsibility structure.
What matters is having a framework that can resist extreme sentiment.
When everyone talks about the KOSPI reaching 10,000, risk should be assessed more carefully.
When everyone says Korean equities are finished, opportunities may emerge to buy quality companies at lower prices.
Equity markets move through cycles of advances and corrections.
10. Conclusion from the NPS Controversy
On a year-over-year basis, the NPS still appears to be in profit on domestic equities.
However, relative to the June peak, about 180 trillion won in paper gains has disappeared, and a further decline could push the opportunity cost above 200 trillion won.
The issue should not be reduced to a retrospective criticism that the fund failed to sell at the top.
More importantly, the NPS needs clear rebalancing rules that are not influenced by political pressure or market sentiment.
A disciplined process of selling part of the position when valuations are high and buying back when they are low is necessary if the fund is to function as a market stabilizer.
At the same time, the NPS must reduce excessive concentration in domestic equities and strengthen global diversification.
Individual investors can also draw lessons from this case.
Unrealized gains are not realized profits.
If gains are not partially locked in at the top, paper profits can shrink at any time.
Even long-term investors therefore need rebalancing.
The future direction of the KOSPI will not be determined by the NPS alone.
Foreign capital flows, semiconductor earnings, US rates, the won-dollar exchange rate, the AI investment cycle, and the global economic outlook will all interact.
At this stage, investors should focus on both supply-demand conditions and fundamentals rather than relying on simple labels such as “cheap” or “risky.”
< Summary >
The NPS still appears to be in profit on domestic equities on a year-over-year basis.
However, compared with the June peak, about 180 trillion won in paper gains has been lost.
Rebalancing deferral delayed selling at the top, and the subsequent market correction amplified the controversy.
Foreign investors sold about 47 trillion won, while share buybacks by Samsung Electronics and SK hynix absorbed a substantial part of that flow.
If buyback support weakens, the KOSPI may lack sufficient demand to stabilize prices.
The core issue is not the NPS’s short-term loss, but Korea’s dependence on pension fund and large-cap buyback demand.
Retail investors should lock in some gains at higher levels and build an asset allocation strategy that considers rates, the exchange rate, US equities, and semiconductor earnings.
[Related Articles…]
- 2026 Global Economic Outlook: Key Drivers and Risks
- AI Semiconductor Cycle and US Equity Investment Trends
*Source: [ Jun’s economy lab ]
– 국민연금은 하락장에 얼마잃었는지 계산해본 결과
